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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
Exploring the Merits of Greenhouse Gas Regulation
By Elise Korican*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency "shall by regulation
prescribe... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles... which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."' Do greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide qualify as "air pollutants" under Section
202 of the Clean Air Act? If so, is the EPA obligated to regulate
such pollutants, and to what extent may the Court review the EPA's
denial of a rulemaking petition requesting such regulation?
In 1999, a rulemaking petition was filed with the EPA to request
regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from new motor vehicles.2
The EPA denied the petition in 2003, finding among other things that
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1. Clean Air Act (CAA) § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
2. International Center for Technology Assessment, et al., Petition for
Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New Motor Vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, Oct.
20, 1999, available at http://www.icta.org/legal/ghgpet.doc.
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it did not have the authority to set emission standards for greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act.3 The petitioners were then joined by
Massachusetts and other state and local governments and sought
review by the D.C. Circuit in Massachusetts v. EPA.4 Two of the
three judges on the panel agreed that the EPA Administrator correctly
exercised his discretion in denying the rulemaking petition, though
each of the judges wrote separately, agreeing and disagreeing on
distinctly different grounds.5
Massachusetts v. EPA was then appealed to the Supreme Court
with three primary issues: 1) whether the petitioners have standing to
challenge the EPA's denial of their rulemaking petition; 2) whether,
and to what extent, the Court can review the merits of the agency's
refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings; and 3) whether the EPA
does have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under
the Clean Air Act and the circumstances under which the EPA may
decline to do so.6 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held: 1) that
petitioners do have standing to challenge their rulemaking petition
denial; 2) that while judicial review of agency refusal to initiate
enforcement proceedings is generally strictly limited, an instance of
denial of rulemaking is subject to review; and 3) the EPA must
regulate greenhouse gas emissions if a finding of endangerment is
made, otherwise decisions not to regulate must be for lack of an
endangerment finding or express notation of profound scientific
uncertainty preventing the ability to implement effective regulation.7
The purpose of this case note is to explore the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Part II provides the historical
background of global warming, related legislation, the enactment of
the Clean Air Act and later amendments, as well as relevant case
holdings as to judicial review of agency decisions and
3. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (noting Title I of the Clean Air Act grants the EPA
authority to regulate and control air pollutants).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 433
F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2960 (U.S. 2006), rev'd, 127
S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007) (No. 05-1120).
5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50.
6. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (U.S. 2007) (hereinafter
"Massachusetts").
7. Id. at 1458-63.
implementation of the Clean Air Act.8 Part III sets out the operative
facts of the Massachusetts v. EPA case beginning with the initial
rulemaking petition, through the decision of the district court of
appeals, and describes the facts as presented to the Supreme Court.9
Part IV outlines the Court's majority and dissenting opinions. 10 Part
V examines the legal impact, and broader societal impact of the
Court's decision." Finally, Part VI concludes this case note.' 2
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Global warming is the rise in near-surface air and water
temperatures on Earth in recent decades.' 3 The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded, "Most of the observed
increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas concentrations."' 4  Global warming is caused by
pollutants, namely carbon dioxide, collecting in the earth's
atmosphere causing the heat from the sun to be trapped which, in
turn, raises Earth's air and water temperatures. 15  The Natural
Resources Defense Council names automobiles the second largest
culprit in the creation of nearly 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide
annually.' 6 According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, global surface temperatures have increased about 0.6
8. See infra pages 431-40.
9. See infra pages 440-45.
10. See infra page 445-67.
11. See infra page 467-73.
12. See infra page 473-75.
13. Wikipedia.com, Global Warming,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Global-warming&oldid= 187293384
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
(Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
15. Natural Resources Defense Council, Global Warming Basics. What it is,
how it's caused, and what needs to be done to stop it,
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/flOl.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
16. Id. Coal-burning power plants are the largest source of carbon dioxide
pollution in the United States, with 2.5 billion tons produced annually. Id.
Spring 2008 Massachusetts v. EPA
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degrees Celsius since the late ninteenth century and about 0.4 degrees
Celsius over the past twenty five years. 7 The effects of global
warming are already apparent in the severe wildfires that have
occurred in many states recently, as well as in floods, droughts and
extreme heat waves throughout the world.18
If left to run its course, scientists predict a number of
consequences are likely to occur based on a continuation of the
current trends. Melting glaciers, rising sea levels, warmer sea
temperatures, increased pest infestation and disrupted natural habitats
are among those predicted to have broad reaching catastrophic
effects) 9
In 1970 Congress passed the Clean Air Act which addressed
rising pollution levels in the air.2" This act was later amended in
17. National Climatic Data Center: United States Department of Commerce,
Global Warming: Frequently Asked Questions, Q 2
http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/globalwarming.html#Q2 (last visited Jan. 27,
2008). Although local temperatures fluctuate naturally, over the past fifty years the
average global temperature has increased at the fastest rate in recorded history. Id.
Experts think the trend is accelerating; the 10 hottest years on record have all
occurred since 1990. Id.
18. Natural Resources Defense Council, Global Warming Basics: What it is,
how it's caused, and what needs to be done to stop it, http://www.nrdc.org/global
Warming/fl0l.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). Global warming is already causing
damage in many parts of the United States. In 2002, Colorado, Arizona and
Oregon endured their worst wildfire seasons ever. Id. The same year, drought
created severe dust storms in Montana, Colorado and Kansas, and floods caused
hundreds of millions of dollars in damage in Texas, Montana and North Dakota.
Id. Since the early 1950s, snow accumulation has declined 60 percent and winter
seasons have shortened in some areas of the Cascade Range in Oregon and
Washington. Id. Of course, the impacts of global warming are not limited to the
United States. Id. In 2003, extreme heat waves caused more than 20,000 deaths in
Europe and more than 1,500 deaths in India. Id. In what scientists regard as an
alarming harbinger of events to come, the area of the Arctic's perennial polar ice
cap is declining at the rate of 9 percent per decade. Id.
19. Id. Melting glaciers, early snowmelt and severe droughts will cause more
dramatic water shortages in the American West. Id. Rising sea levels will lead to
coastal flooding on the Eastern seaboard, in Florida, and in other areas, such as the
Gulf of Mexico. Id. Warmer sea surface temperatures will fuel more intense
hurricanes in the southeastern Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Id. Forests, farms and
cities will face troublesome new pests and more mosquito-borne diseases. Id.
Disruption of habitats such as coral reefs and alpine meadows could drive many
plant and animal species to extinction. Id.
20. Clean Air Act §§ 101-618(g), 42 U.S. C. §§ 7401-7671g (2000).
1974, 1977, and 1990 and gave the EPA Administrator the authority
to define air pollutants and acceptable concentrations of such
pollutants, and review state plans to regulate pollutant sources. 21 Title
II of the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate harmful pollutants from
new motor vehicles.22 In 1970, Congress added Section 302(h) of the
Clean Air Act, asserting that "[a]ll language referring to effects on
welfare includes.. effects on... weather ... and climate. 23
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act, "air pollutant" is defined as
"including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive ...
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air."24  The pressing issue, which led to the case of
Massachusetts v. EPA, is the crucial question of whether greenhouse
gases are considered "air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act.
In 1977, the D.C. Circuit, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, addressed the
interpretation of the language in Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA).25 In the case, Ethyl, a manufacturer of lead additives
and refiner of gasoline, argued the EPA must find proof of actual
harm in order to regulate gasoline additives, namely lead.26  The
court in Ethyl Corp. interpreted the CAA in a manner which provided
the EPA Administrator authority to act when a pollutant "will
endanger" the public health or welfare.27 In its discussion, the court
noted that Congress had removed from Section 211 of the CAA
specific language which used to include a "findings requirement"
standard to be used by the EPA Administrator when acting under the
"will endanger" standard.28 The "will endanger" standard was found
by the court, sitting en banc, to be preventative in nature.29  The
21. Id.
22. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
23. Clean Air Act § 302(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
24. See Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
25. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 13 (agreeing with the EPA Administrator that "will endanger"
should be interpreted to mean "presents a significant risk of harm").
27. Id. Note that the word "will" is used, meaning "about to" or "expected to"
happen, not necessarily already happened.
28. Id. at 14-15.
29. Id. at 17. The court basically found that the language allowed for the
Administrator to act before danger occurred rather than restricting action to after
danger had already occurred.
Spring 2008 Massachusetts v. EPA
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court's interpretation of the "will endanger" language in Section 211
of the CAA upheld the EPA's preventative regulation requiring
annual reductions in the lead content of leaded gasoline.30 This was
an important ruling that broadened the EPA Administrator's power to
regulate pollutants since it allowed for regulation absent actual harm.
Specifically, the court held the Clean Air Act "and common sense...
demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is
less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable." 31
The court's ruling in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA led to specific 1977
amendments to the CAA. Namely, Congress amended Section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, altering it from "air pollution which
endangers the public health" to "air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health. ' 32 The main purpose of the
1977 Amendments was to aid states in achieving their goals, as many
failed to meet the standards first set by the Clean Air Act.33
A year later, in 1978, the D.C. Circuit dealt with the issue of
statutory uncertainty and the use of policy considerations to "gap-
fill" where an agency administrator is unable to use the plain
language of a statute for decision making direction. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, petitioners challenged EPA
regulations prohibiting discharge of a toxic substance,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), into the nation's waterways. 34
The petitioners argued principally that the EPA had inadequate
scientific knowledge of the PCBs at issue (less chlorinated PCB
mixtures) and therefore lacked an adequate basis for regulation. 35
30. See id. at 1.
31. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 25.
32. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
33. Robyn Kenney, Clean Air Act, United States, Encyclopedia of Earth (Oct.
4, 2006), http://www.eoearth.org/article/CleanAirActUnitedStates (last visited
December 21, 2007). One major revision brought by the 1977 amendments
tightens pollution control for newly built sources and brings older plants under the
Clean Air Act's regulations. Id. The 1977 amendments instituted the New Source
Review (NSR), which requires companies to obtain permits before modifying
equipment. Id.
34. Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 79. Most scientific studies in existence were of highly chlorinated
PCBs. Id. However, during the 1970's public concern for the harmful nature of
these chemicals encouraged a shift to less chlorinated PCBs. Id. This shift
occurred rapidly, causing a gap in scientific knowledge. Id. Petitioners also argued
Among other counter-arguments, the EPA cited Ethyl Corp. v. EPA
for the notion that action does not need to be delayed in order to wait
for actual causal links to be established between the toxins and harm
to health or the environment.36 In ruling on the petitioners'
challenge, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its use of the
substantial evidence standard in reviewing scientific rulemaking.37 It
was noted, in the court's opinion, that there is a clear distinction
between factual determinations and policy decisions at the
administrative level.38 The court held that where the agency has
insufficient information to make an informed factual decision, policy
considerations must guide the agency's rulemaking and the court will
uphold these policy judgments. 39
More than a decade after the Environmental Defense Fund case
was heard, the D.C. Circuit ruled, in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, on a challenge to the EPA's decision to
abandon amendments to vinyl chloride emission standards set under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act.4 ° Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
provides the EPA Administrator with authority to define air
pollutants and "set an emission standard... at the level which in his
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health.",41 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) argued
the Administrator was required under Section 112 of the Clean Air
the EPA's authority, under the 1972 Act, to ban the discharge of PCB's into
waterways is preempted by the Toxic Substances Control Act passed by Congress
to phase out PCB's over a two and a half year period. Congress enacted the Toxic
Substances Control Act in 1976, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629, which included a
specific section addressing PCBs, Section 6(e). The court held there was no
congressional intent that the TSCA preempt EPA's authority and that, so long as
there was a finding of risk to health or environment, regulation was proper. Id. at
76.
36. Id. at 79. The EPA was arguing for use of the "will endanger" standard
upheld in Ethyl Corp. and wanted to be able to act to prevent harm before it
occurred.
37. Id. at 82.
38. Id.
39. Id. This is meant to stand for the proposition that, when the decisions
involve agency discretionary decisions "on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,"
policy considerations may play a role. Id.
40. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
41. Id. at 1148.
Spring 2008 Massachusetts v. EPA
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Act to make emissions decisions based on health-related factors, thus
the unknown health risks posed by carcinogenic agents of vinyl
chloride required the Administrator to prohibit all emissions.42 The
EPA had concluded that it had two options based on its authority
under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act: 1) require a complete
prohibition of such emissions, or 2) set emission standards such that
they are the "lowest level achievable by use of the best available
control technology."4 3 The EPA found that the first alternative posed
an unreasonable cost in that it would require closure of an entire
industry and therefore chose to act under the second option.44 The
court reviewed the EPA's actions to determine whether they were
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.",45 The court found that Congress' wording in
the statute, providing that the Administrator act to allow for an
"ample margin of safety," does not affect the Administrator's
authority to act in the face of uncertainty.46 Further, the court said
the language on its face clearly did not mean free of all risk, but
substantially safe from risk.47 The court explained that if they were
to find the Administrator must ban all emissions when uncertainty
exists, the court would ultimately be removing all of the
Administrator's discretion.48 In fact, the discretion granted to the
Administrator by the statute is used most ideally in the very case of
uncertainty. However, the court did find that Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act required that the Administrator's discretion be used in
42. Id. at 1147.
43. Id. at 1148.
44. Id. This is because vinyl chloride "is a gaseous synthetic chemical used in
the manufacture of plastics." Id. Thus, complete prohibition of this emission
would require the plastics industry itself to be shut down.
45. Id. at 1152; Clean Air Act section 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (1982).
This is known as Chevron deference.
46. Natural Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1152. The NRDC took
the position that the "ample margin of safety" standard meant the Administrator
had no discretion in the face of uncertainty. Id. The court said the statute nowhere
defines ample margin of safety and that acting in a situation of uncertainty does not




a manner that relates to public health and safety.49 In the case of
NRDC v. EPA, the Administrator made the decision as to the
regulation of vinyl chloride on a determination of industry cost and
technological feasibility rather than public health and safety, thus the
Administrator's discretion was not properly exercised.5 °
The most recent amendments to the CAA in 1990 addressed the
latest issues and threats to the environment of the United States "in
order to improve air quality by imposing restrictions on the release of
hazardous pollutants into the atmosphere., 51 The 1990 Amendments
imposed greater restrictions on power plant emissions allowances,
identified twenty-two cities having excessive levels of ozone and
carbon monoxide and required the owners of commercial fleet
vehicles to begin purchasing clean-fuel vehicles. 52  The 1990
amendments also called for establishing a national permits program
to make the law more workable, and an improved enforcement
program to help ensure better compliance with the Act.53
49. Id. at 1164-65. This seems to be the standard applied by the Supreme
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA as, in both instances, the court requires strict
adherence to the authorizing statute's wording when the agency makes
discretionary decisions.
50. Natural Resources Defense Council, 824 F.2d at 1165.
51. Energy Information Administration, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil-gas/natural-gas/analysis-publications/ngmajorleg/clnai
ract.html (last visited January 21, 2008).
52. Id. The impact of the 1990 amendments was significant. Since natural
gas is a relatively clean-burning fuel, it became an attractive energy source for
industries seeking to lower their emissions. Id. Most electric utilities met the legal
threshold by fuel-switching to low-sulfur coal or by increasing the use of gas at
existing units. Id. The legislation, proposed by President Bush was designed to
address three major issues: acid rain, urban air pollution, and toxic air emissions.
53. Overview: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/overview.txt (last
visited March 3, 2008). Clearly compliance with the Act was still an issue even
thirteen years after the 1977 amendments. According to the Encyclopedia of Earth:
[The] Clean Air Act of 1990 introduces a permit program for
large sources that release pollutants into the air. The permit
includes information on which pollutants are being released, how
much may be released, and steps the source's owner or operator
are taking to reduce the pollution. This permit system simplifies
and clarifies business' obligations for reducing air pollution. The
1990 Clean Air Act includes other provisions to reduce interstate
air pollution, and covers pollution that originates in Mexico and
Spring 2008
202 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
It was not until 1998 that the question of whether carbon dioxide
should be classified as an air pollutant was addressed. In what has
become known as the Cannon Memorandum, the former EPA
General Counsel, Jonathon Cannon, found that carbon dioxide (C0 2)
is in fact an air pollutant under Section 302(g) of the Clean Air Act.54
The memorandum specified, however, that in order for the EPA to be
required to regulate this air pollutant, there must be a finding of
endangerment to public health or welfare. 55
Canada that is transported into the United States as well as
pollution that originates in the United States and affects Canada
and Mexico. The EPA's enforcement powers broadened with the
new amendment; the EPA is now authorized to fine violators and
increase penalties for violations of the Act...
The 1990 amendment also addresses acid rain pollution by
creating a market-based system as a means to reduce sulfur
dioxide emissions from power plants. There are two phases;
Phase I targets the highest emission producing plants, which were
expected to achieve reductions by 1995, and Phase II, which
began in 2000, affects smaller plants and calls for stricter
reductions from Phase I sources. Companies are allowed to either
bank their allowances or trade them with other companies.
Robyn Kenney, Clean Air Act, United States, Encyclopedia of Earth (Oct.
4, 2006), available at
http://www.eoearth.org/article/CleanAir Act,_ UnitedStates.
54. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, on EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric
Power Generation Sources, pg 2 (April 10, 1998). The opinion written by Cannon
was done so at the request of Congressman DeLay and was meant to determine
whether the EPA had the authority to control the pollution requirements for four
pollutants: nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and mercury. These
questions arose with regard to restructuring of the utility industry and electric
power utilization. Then current General Counsel, Gary Guzy, reiterated this view
before a Congressional hearing in October 1999. Testimony of Gary S. Guzy
before a Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform and
the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Science, U.S.
House of Representatives (October 6, 1999).
55. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, on EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric
Power Generation Sources, 4 (April 10, 1998). Interestingly, both Guzy and
Cannon stressed that EPA "has made no determination to date to exercise [its]
authority" to regulate greenhouse gases under the Act. Id. Yet both clearly believe
that EPA could move forward with regulation if it wanted to - or if it thought such
a move were politically viable.
In Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., respondents, tobacco manufacturers and retailers, argued the
FDA had not properly exercised its authority under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in deciding to regulate tobacco products.5 6
This case addressed the issue of broad congressional grant of
authority on the face of an act, and an agency's abuse of such broad
authority to regulate an area of political and economic sensitivity.
The FDCA grants the FDA authority to regulate "drugs" and
"devices", two categories in which the FDA argued tobacco products
neatly fit.57 The United States Supreme Court turned to the plain
language of the statute to determine Congress' intent and held there
was no intent to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco. 58 The court
reasoned that to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco would allow a
ban on tobacco under the FDCA which would be in clear conflict
with Congress' intent to keep tobacco on the market.59
III. FACTS
56. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 120 (2000).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 142. Once again the court is examining the face of the authorizing
statute, a practice of many courts, and eventually a concept which leads to the
Supreme Court's ruling in the present case. In considering Congress' intent, the
court in Brown & Williamson says: "Considering the FDCA as a whole, it is clear
that Congress intended to exclude tobacco products from the FDA's jurisdiction."
Id.; see also infra note 59 (explaining the steps made to arrive at this conclusion).
Further, the court explains that, when looking at "tobacco-specific legislation"
passed by Congress in the last 35 years, there have been six separate pieces of
legislation enacted since 1965 addressing the problem of tobacco use and its effect
on health. Id. at 143. All of these pieces of legislation require, among other things,
warning labels on packaging, prohibit certain advertising, and report research
findings on the addictive nature of tobacco. Id. at 143-44; see infra note 127
(citing in full the legislation which conflicted with a finding that the FDA should
regulate tobacco).
59. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 142-43. The court made this conclusion
because clearly tobacco would not be safe for the public health under FDA
standards. Thus, by default, if the FDA were given the authority to regulate
tobacco, the FDA would be required to ban it in order to fulfill its obligation to
protect public health. This is because, under the FDCA, any product regulated by
the FDA must be safe for intended use, except those products which are banned.
Id.
Spring 2008 Massachusetts v. EPA
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On October 20, 1999, several organizations, including the
International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA), petitioned
the EPA to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles and engines.6" The petitioners cited various sources,
including Title II of the Clean Air Act, beginning with Section
202(a)(1), as evidence of authority granted to the EPA Administrator
to regulate pollution emissions from new motor vehicles.61 In 2003,
in response to the rulemaking petition and after a notice and
comment period,62 the EPA General Counsel, Robert Fabricant,
removed the Cannon Memorandum and stated that carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases cannot be considered air pollutants for
any contribution they may make to global climate change. 63  In
denying the rulemaking petition, Fabricant cited Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., relating the broad grant of authority
60. International Center for Technology Assessment, et al., Petition for
Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New Motor Vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, Oct.
20, 1999, available at http://www.icta.org/legal/ghgpet.doc.
61. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62. The EPA received almost 50,000 comments from the public on the
petition. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,924. This could be construed as strong evidence
of the widespread public concern over global warming.
63. Robert E. Fabricant, Memorandum, EPA's Authority to Impose
Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air Act
(Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.connellfoley.com/hselaw/pdf/Fabricantmemo.pdf (hereinafter
Fabricant Memorandum). Fabricant stated that Cannon's findings no longer
represented the views of the EPA's General Counsel. Id. Fabricant explained that
"[a]lthough the Act specifically authorizes information development and 'non-
regulatory' measures related to global climate change, there is no indication that
Congress intended EPA to regulate in this particular area." Id. He also relies on
the Supreme Court's decision in the Brown & Williamson case (see discussion
infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text) as evidence the EPA was "urged on this
view" that the agency cannot rely on broad grants of power to regulate large
industries in the economy. 68 Fed. Reg. 52,926. Interestingly, the two prior
memoranda (Cannon's memo as well as Guzy's) were both issued while President
Clinton was in office. Fabricant was appointed by President Bush, whose
environmental policy was much more controversial than that of President Clinton.
The Bush Administration took multiple initiatives to encourage control of climate
change. Such initiatives included efforts to promote fuel cell and hybrid vehicles
and a move toward developing hydrogen fuel as opposed to gasoline for permanent
use in vehicles. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003).
Massachusetts v. EPA
given the EPA by the CAA to the similarly broad authority given the
FDA by the FDCA.64  Fabricant noted that greenhouse gasses
(GHGs) are a similarly politically sensitive area of the regulation, the
regulation of which must be substantiated by Congress' intent to
designate such authority.65 Fabricant found there was no such intent
on the part of Congress and relied on the fact that in 1990,
amendments to the CAA which would place GHGs under the EPA's
strict control were rejected.66 Further, the EPA argued Congress had
addressed global climate change in other legislation and that to
regulate greenhouse gases would have an even greater economic
effect than would regulating tobacco in Brown & Williamson.67 The
EPA concluded that such GHGs did not fall under the CAA's
definition of air pollution. 68 The denial of the rulemaking petition
also claimed regulation of GHGs would conflict with the Department
of Transportation's authority to set mileage standards for new motor
vehicles under the Energy Policy Conservation Act.69
Lastly, in denying the rulemaking petition, the EPA argued that
even if Congress had granted the EPA the authority to regulate GHGs
from new motor vehicles, action under section 202(a)(1) is not
64. See Fabricant Memorandum.
65. Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,928. In
other words, when the issue is of such political and social sensitivity and relevance,
an agency cannot just find implied power to regulate such issue but must find that
congress actually intended the agency to regulate it.
66. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,928-29. The EPA relied on the fact that Congress
"was well aware of the global climate change issue when it last comprehensively
amended the [Clean Air Act] in 1990" thus declining to adopt a proposed
amendment, establishing that the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions was a clear sign of intent not to delegate such authority. 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,926. The EPA stood for the proposition that Congress never intended the
agency to regulate concentrations of pollutants that are consistent throughout the
world, but intended only for the EPA to regulate local pollutants. 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,927.
67. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52, 928. The EPA's ultimate conclusion was that
Congress would have needed to specifically grant the EPA authority to regulate
greenhouse gases for such statutory authority to exist.
68. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52, 928.
69. Id. The EPA explained its reasoning by noting that the only way to curtail
vehicular greenhouse emissions is to regulate fuel economy, which would conflict
with the Department of Transportation's authority. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.
Spring 2008
206 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
mandatory, thus refusing to act is fully justified.70 The EPA cited the
wording in Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, which states that it is at
the discretion of the Administrator to make a finding of
endangerment, thus declining to implement rulemaking is fully
justified, especially given the scientific uncertainty as to the effects
of GHGs on public health and welfare. 71 The agency did recognize
that the concentration levels of greenhouse gases have dramatically
increased as a result of manmade emissions and that accompanying
increases in air temperature have occurred, but denied the existence
of proof of a clear causal link between the two.72 The EPA used this
uncertainty as further support for its denial of the rulemaking
petition. 73 Finally, the EPA argued regulation of motor-vehicle
emissions would be a "piecemeal approach" to climate change and
would conflict with any "comprehensive program" developed by the
executive branch to address the problem. 74
Upon denial of the rulemaking petition twelve states, three cities,
and several major environmental groups, along with the original
petitioners, filed a lawsuit with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to Section 307 of the
Clean Air Act.75 The case was heard by a three-judge panel that
70. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.
71. Id. The EPA offered various policy arguments in support of the denial of
rulemaking petition. Namely, the EPA argued regulation of GHGs would be
ineffective and would result in "an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing
the climate change issue." 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,930. EPA also claimed regulations
of GHGs under Section 202 would involve foreign policy issues and likely conflict
with voluntary emission reduction plans already in effect. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.
72. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,930.
73. Id.
74. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931, 52932.
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Section 307(b) of
the Clean Air Act states:
A petition for review of action of the Administrator in
promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under
section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or
requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under
section 7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be
prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of this title), any
determination under section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control
or prohibition under section 7545 of this title, any standard under
ruled against petitioners in a split decision. Judge Raymond
Randolph found for the EPA, concluding the agency correctly cited
policy reasons for declining to engage in rulemaking.76 Judge
Randolph determined the Administrator's exercise of "judgment" as
to whether a pollutant could "reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare, 77 could be based on scientific uncertainty as
well as other policy factors, including the concern that unilateral
regulation of U.S. motor-vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from other countries. 78  Judge
David Sentelle concluded that petitioners had failed to
"demonstrat[e] the element of injury necessary to establish standing
under Article III" in that they did not allege "particularized injuries"
to themselves.79 Sentelle joined Randolph's judgment on the merits
in finding for the EPA.8 ° Judge David Tatel dissented, arguing
Massachusetts's harm was particularized because the state was losing
acres of coastline due to rising waters as a result of global warming,
and that EPA's reasons for refusing to regulate were incoherent and
did not form a basis for the agency's decision.81 This fractured
decision gave no guidance for future challenges to global warming.
section 7571 of this title, any rule issued under section 7413,
7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally
applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the
Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Clean Air Act § 307(a), 42 U.S.C. §7607(a).
76. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 58.
77. Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)(1).
78. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 58. In ruling in this manner, Judge
Randolph gave the EPA the ability to avoid making an endangerment
determination as required by the Clean Air Act. He did so by improper reliance on
Ethyl Corp. See infra note 140.
79. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 59-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 60-61 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 64-66, 67-82 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel gave multiple
reasons for agreeing with the petitioners that the CAA explicitly gives the EPA
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. See id. at 61-62 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting). Primarily Tatel argued for a strict, plain language reading of the CAA
which did, according to him, provide the EPA with authority to regulate "any air
pollutant." See id. at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that based on the plain
language of the statute, the EPA is authorized, in its judgment, to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles). Judge Tatel also opined that
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After a rehearing en banc was denied, Massachusetts filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court
on March 2, 2006 and, on June 26, 2006, certiorari was granted.82
One of the EPA's primary arguments was that uncertainty
surrounding various features of climate change justified the EPA's
denial of the rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gases.83 The
three relevant issues raised in the case were: 1) Do Massachusetts
and the other petitioners have legal standing to bring the lawsuit?; 84
2) Are greenhouse gases "air pollutants" under section 202 of the
federal Clean Air Act?;85 and 3) In refusing to regulate greenhouse
gases under Section 202, may the EPA consider factors other than
public health and welfare?86
In a forty-page opinion, including two dissents, the Supreme
Court held in favor of the petitioners in a close, five to four split.87
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found Massachusetts did
have standing to sue and that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the
event the Administrator forms a "judgment" that such emissions
contribute to climate change. 88 Further, Stevens found the EPA can
scientific uncertainty is not addressed in the CAA as a reason for deciding not to
issue regulations under the statute. See id. at 77-78 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
In another surprising similarity to the eventual majority opinion in the
Supreme Court, Judge Tatel also argued that not only was scientific uncertainty
absent from the list of considerations permissible for the Administrator in deciding
whether to regulate, but the one consideration, endangerment to public health and
welfare, that is in the statute was not even considered by the EPA. See id. at 77
(Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel's remaining arguments are all surprisingly
similar to those made in the majority opinion in the present case in the Supreme
Court.
Judge Tatel also criticized the EPA's reliance on Brown & Williamson and
congressional inaction as misplaced. Id. at 71 (Tatel, J., dissenting). He explained
that because the EPA has already extensively been regulating the energy and
transportation industries under the CAA, the EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions would be accepted under the CAA. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
82. Massachusetts, 126 U.S. 2960 (2006).
83. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1466-67; see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52, 930-31.
84. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1452-53.
85. Id. at 1459.
86. Id. at 1462.
87. Id. at 1464.
88. See Id. at 1452-1458.
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avoid taking regulatory action with respect to greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles only if the agency determines
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it
provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not
exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. 89
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Steven's Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens begins with an emphatic opening, explaining
there is "well-documented" history as to the rise of global
temperatures and the coinciding build-up of carbon dioxide. 90 He is
quick to point out this theory is supported by "respected scientists"
and proceeds to detail the effects of carbon dioxide on the
atmosphere by trapping heat.91 Justice Stevens notes the petitioners'
concerns that global warming is "the most pressing environmental
challenge" of this era and outlines the two issues at hand in this case:
"whether the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles; and if so, whether its stated reasons
for refusing to do so are consistent with the authorizing statute." 92
Justice Stevens points to the relevant aspects of the Clean Air Act
by citing Section 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), and pointing out
that the Act defines "air pollutant" broadly under § 7602(g) as well as
"welfare" under § 7602(h).93 When these provisions were enacted,
89. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
90. Id. at 1446.
91. Id. at 1446. When carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere it
creates a ceiling much like that of a greenhouse by trapping solar energy and
prohibiting the escape of reflected heat. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1447.
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this
section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare...
Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1) 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). "Air pollutant" includes "any
air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
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knowledge of climate change and its causes were largely unknown
though increasing carbon dioxide levels, Stevens says, were duly
noted.94 He describes the increasing awareness of the effects of
carbon dioxide in the 1970's as evidenced by congressional actions
like the enactment of the National Climate Program Act and requests
by President Carter for National Research Council investigation of
the subject.95 In the 1980's Congress continued to take action by
enacting the Global Climate Protection Act requesting that the EPA
propose a national, integrated program to combat deforestation and
other likely effects of climate change after learning that "manmade
pollution.. .may be producing a long-term and substantial increase in
the average temperature on Earth., 96 Finally, Stevens notes, in 1990
biological, radioactive ... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air." § 7601(g). "Welfare" among other things, includes
"effects on ... weather ... and climate." § 7602(h).
94. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1447.
95. Id. at 1448. The NRC's response to President Carter's request was that
increasing carbon dioxide levels will result in substantial climate changes and "a
wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until its too late." Id. (quoting the Climate
Research Board, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment, p. vii
(1979)).
96. Id. at 1448 (quoting The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 §
1102(1)). In the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Congress acknowledged
that while the effects of global warming/climate change may not be "fully
manifest" until the next century, deforestation and pollution may be contributing to
the irreversible process. The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 § 1102(3).
The key goals of the Act were to increase global understanding, cooperation, and
development of technologies aimed to combat the greenhouse effect. § 1103(a).
Under the Act, the President was responsible for "developing and proposing to
Congress a coordinated national policy on global climate change." § 1103(b). The
EPA and the Secretary of State were ordered by the Act to jointly submit to
Congress a report on the current scientific understanding of the greenhouse effect
and its consequences, and assessment of United States efforts to gain international
cooperation in limiting global climate change, and provide a description of the
strategy by which the US intends to gain further international cooperation. § 1104.
It seems that, by this Act, Congress clearly involved the EPA in this issue on
an international level, which, to some degree, trumps the EPA's argument that
international affairs issues absolve the agency from having to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52,931-32 (EPA's policy arguments as to why it
would be inappropriate to engage in such regulation at this time).
If, as long ago as 1980, Congress turned to the EPA to combat deforestation
and air pollution which contributed to global warming, it seems very likely
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a
report on the topic, affirming that the effect of manmade emissions is
in fact global warming which results in warming of the Earth's
surface. 97 This IPCC report, Stevens explains, led to an agreement
among 154 nations to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases.98 Within five years the IPCC was unequivocally confirming
its 1990 report.99
After concluding his brief historical background on the
understanding of global warming and resulting executive branch
actions, Justice Stevens gets to the petitioner's arguments: mainly
that substantial evidence shows that greenhouse gas emissions lead to
climate change which has led to record warm temperatures which
will likely lead to serious effects on human health and the
environment.1"0 The petitioners cited the Cannon Memorandum's
finding that carbon dioxide emission is within the EPA's authority to
regulate as evidence the EPA itself has admitted having such
authority.' 0' Justice Stevens summarizes the history of petitioners'
request for rulemaking which concluded in 2003 with the denial of
the rulemaking petition. 10 2 He makes note that before the close of the
comment period on the rulemaking petition the White House sought
assistance in clarifying uncertainties in the realm of climate change
from the National Research Council which resulted in a 2001 report
confirming that "greenhouse gases are accumulating... as a result of
Congress would turn to the EPA presently to continue to regulate, or begin to
regulate in a different manner, greenhouse gas emissions.
97. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1448.
98. Id. This occurred at the United Nations "Earth Summit" in 1992 in Rio
De Janeiro. Twenty years after the first global environment conference, the UN
sought to help Governments rethink economic development and find ways to halt
the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of the planet. The
Earth Summit was the planning, education and negotiations among all Member
States of the United Nations, leading to the adoption of Agenda 21, a wide-ranging
blueprint for action to achieve sustainable development worldwide.
99. Id. at 1449.
100. Id.
101. Id. As discussed supra, the Cannon Memorandum was withdrawn in
2003 during response to the rulemaking petition by the EPA former Gereral
Counsel. See supra note 63.
102. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1449; 68 Fed.Reg. 52,922. See also supra
notes 63-74.
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human activities..." and emphasizing that "temperatures are, in fact,
rising."' 3  A summary of the D.C. Circuit court's ruling on the
matter and denial of the petitioner's claim follows.' 04
In the first section of analysis, Justice Stevens determines the
issue of standing, one this case note will mention as relevant
summary of the case but not discuss in great detail. Article III of the
United States Constitution requires all cases brought in federal court
meet the cases and controversies requirement. 0 5  In other words,
federal courts may not decide hypothetical issues but must wait until
injured parties bring cases to their courts.10 6 Justice Stevens, in a
lengthy discussion addressing the various claims the EPA asserted
against petitioner's standing, concludes that Massachusetts does in
fact have standing to bring their claim in federal court. 107 He
explains that Massachusetts, having a majority of its borders on the
sea, has a particular injury in that the state has a sovereign interest in
protecting its land from rising sea levels caused by global warming
resulting from greenhouse gas emissions.'0 8  Importantly, Justice
Stevens notes that petitioners were granted statutory authorization
under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) to bring suit to assert their rights under
the Clean Air Act "without meeting all of the normal requirements of
redressability and immediacy" though actual injury must have been
103. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1450 (quoting Climate Change: An Analysis
of Some Key Questions (NRC Report), 1 (2001)). It is important to note that,
although this definitely shows there is increasing awareness and concern for global
warming and emissions causing global warming, it does not necessarily have
anything to do with the EPA nor is it evidence the EPA is supposed to regulate
such emissions. The NRC report was cited by both Judge Tatel in his dissenting
opinion in the D.C. Circuit Court opinion on this case as well as here, in the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court ruling. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d
at 77 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
104. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1451-52.
105. See U.S. CONST. art. III. There are three requirements to establish
standing: 1) injury in fact; 2) causation; and 3) redressability.
106. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Parties
bringing suit in federal court must have suffered an actual injury as a result of the
challenged act, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the act, and court must be
able to give a decision that would provide relief to the party. Id. at 559-60.
107. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1453-55.
108. Id. at 1454.
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suffered.' 0 9 He notes that when a state enters the union it surrenders
certain sovereign prerogatives to the Federal Government, such that
the state cannot enter into treaties with foreign countries or invade
other states to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 110 Thus,
Congress has "ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others)
by prescribing standards" for the limitation of pollutants from new
motor vehicles deemed to effect the public health and welfare."1
Justice Stevens finds that, given "Massachusetts' stake in protecting
its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special
solicitude in [the Court's] standing analysis. ' 12 Stevens concludes
that Massachusetts had suffered concrete harm, there is a causal
connection between the harm and the emission of greenhouse gases,
and that reducing the rate of increase in greenhouse gas emissions
would slow the harmful progress of climate change. 1 3
In the fifth section of his opinion, Justice Stevens delves into the
merits of the case, the focus of this case note. He begins by defining
the Court's scope of review as narrow and says that Chevron
deference must be given to the agency's actions. 1 4  Most
importantly, agency discretion is at its height when the agency
109. Id. at 1453. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) "A petition for review of
action of the Administrator in promulgating any ... standard under section 7521 of
this title ... or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
110. Id. at 1454.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1455-57. The court determined actual injury was suffered as a
result of global warming's effect on natural ecosystems. Id. Since the court has
previously held that only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit the
case to be considered for review, a finding that Massachusetts has standing allows
the case to proceed on the merits. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst.
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
114. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1459. According to the Court in Chevron v.
NRDC, an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited
resources and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities. Chevron U.S.A
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984). Courts are
to defer to agency interpretations where the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue and look only for evidence the agency acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
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decides not to bring an enforcement action.115 Justice Stevens
quickly notes that there is a distinct difference here between denying
a petition for rulemaking where parties have a procedural right to
bring and refuse to bring enforcement actions. 16 Since the Clean Air
Act specifically permits review of the EPA's denial of rulemaking
petitions under Section 307 of the Clean Air Act, Stevens is
permitted to review and reverse the EPA's actions using the arbitrary
and capricious standard discussed previously. 117 With this standard
of review in mind, Justice Stevens begins his resolution of the
questions which have arisen in the case.
1. Does section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorize the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emission from new motor vehicles in the
event that it forms a "judgment" that such emissions contribute to
climate change?" 8
115. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1459. The Court, in Overton Park v. Volpe,
allowed judicial review of an agency discretionary decision, and required the
agency to explain how it considered the two factors it had to satisfy to grant funds
for highway construction that went through a city park. Citizens to Pres. Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 357 F.Supp. 846 (D. Tenn.1973). The agency was required to
offer reasons for its decision consistent with these factors.
However, in Heckler v. Chaney, the court refused to allow judicial review of
an agency decision by the FDA to not enforce food and drug law requirements
before states could legally use drugs for lethal injections. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985). The agency non-enforcement decision was within the agency's
excusive discretion, and there was no law to apply (there were no factors the
agency was required by law to consider in making its decision as there were in
Overton). Id. The court in Heckler ruled that because enforcement decisions
usually require a high level of agency coordination and expertise and because there
is inherently a lack of danger the agency is exercising coercive power by refusing
to act, that substantial deference was owed to such decisions. Id. at 831-32. The
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA found a distinct difference between the refusal to
enforce a rule in Heckler and the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petitions in
Massachusetts. Further, the Court relied on the Clean Air Act itself for the notion
that review of such a decision by the Court was warranted. See Clean Air Act §
307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); see also supra note 75.
116. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1459.
117. Id.; see supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the Chevron
deference standard and use of the standard).
118. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1459.
Justice Stevens unequivocally answers this question in the
affirmative, finding that the express wording of Section 202 grants
authority to the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles. 119 The EPA's counter argument to this remains
rooted in the belief that Congress did not intend for the EPA to
regulate emissions affecting climate change. Thus, under this
reasoning, carbon dioxide as an emission that affects climate change
does not qualify under the statute as an "air pollutant."'120  Justice
Stevens quashes this argument by emphasizing the statute's repeated
use of the word "any" when describing the air pollutants the EPA is
authorized to regulate. 121  Stevens interprets Congress' intent as
broad and meaning that the EPA must regulate "all airborne
compounds" and that the statute is "unambiguous" on this point. 122
In a related discussion, Stevens nullifies the EPA's argument that
post-enactment legislative history shows Congress meant to curtail
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1460. This argument on the EPA's part is lacking, and finds its
basis mostly in the EPA's point that post enactment legislative history indicates
contrary Congressional intent. As indicated by the Court, post enactment legislative
history is a weak argument for the intent of Congress in enacting the statute.
121. Id.
122. Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g); Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct.
at 1456. Stevens argues for looking to the plain meaning of the statute. In his view,
under the plain meaning there is no ambiguity, thus the EPA did not need to
interpret the statute. It was clear: the EPA had authority to regulate greenhouse
gases because the statute chose, by plain language, to define its terms broadly.
This is one main argument opposing Justice Scalia's dissent which argues for
Chevron deference and criticizes Steven's improper analysis of the EPA's decision
not to initiate rulemaking. See also infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text
(containing the portion of Steven's opinion which addresses the relevance of what
he views to be the broad language of section 202(a)). This argument by Stevens,
that because the plain language of the statute was unambiguous the EPA was not
entitled to interpret it, is extremely important to the face of judicial review of
agency decisions. The Court found that no interpretation was permissible because
the agency was bound to the plain language due to their inability to produce
information to indicate contrary Congressional intent. Id. It seems that such proof
would require some interpretation on the part of the agency anyway. Instead the
decision by the court may suggest a two part method for the agency to pursue: first,
identifying the plain language of the statute and second, determining whether
contrary Congressional intent existed. The EPA failed to clearly explain any
contrary intent by Congress, thus under this reasoning by the Court the EPA cannot
prevail. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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the agency's power to regulate greenhouse gases by pointing out that
even if this was the case, the EPA failed to correctly identify any
such history. 123 He further emphasizes that Congress' efforts to
promote research and interagency collaboration "do not conflict with
any thoughtful regulatory effort; they complement it."'124
Justice Stevens then outlines two reasons why the EPA's reliance
on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. was incorrect. First, where
the FDA would have banned tobacco, the EPA in the present case
could only regulate greenhouse gas emissions.125 Further, in Brown
& Williamson Congress had no intent to ban tobacco products
whereas there is no such argument in the present case as to Congress'
intent not to curtail harmful emissions leading to global warming. 126
Second, Stevens explains, in Brown & Williamson there were
congressional enactments that would directly conflict with anything
but a finding that the FDA did not have the authority to regulate
tobacco.' 27 Here, there are no conflicting congressional enactments
that would make EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
123. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1460. The Court cites United States v. Price
and Cobell v. Norton for the proposition that legislative history following the
passage of an Act by Congress is irrelevant. See 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); see
also Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070 (C.A.D.C. 2005).
124. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1460.
125. Id. at 1461.
126. Id. On the contrary, Congress' various actions show they in fact wish to
do that very thing: curtail greenhouse gas emissions.
127. Id. In Brown & Williamson the court explained:
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since
1965 addressing the problem of tobacco and human health. Those
statutes, among other things, require that health warnings appear
on all packaging and in all print and outdoor advertisements,
prohibit the advertisement of tobacco products through any
medium of electronic communication subject to regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission, require the Secretary of
HHS to report every three years to Congress on the research
findings concerning the addictive property of tobacco, and make
States' receipt of certain federal block grants contingent on their
making in unlawful for any manufacturer, retailer, or distributor
of tobacco products to sell or distribute any such product to any
individual under the age of 18.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143-44 (citations omitted). It would clearly be
counterintuitive to then ban tobacco when there are six specific statutes regulating
tobacco.
new motor vehicles nonsensical. 2 8 The EPA even affirmed that it
had such authority in 1998.129
Next, Justice Stevens diminishes the EPA's argument that
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
would conflict with the Department of Transportation's duties to set
mileage standards.13 ° He emphasizes that the EPA's duty to protect
the public's "health" and "welfare" is an environmental duty separate
from the Department of Transportation altogether.' 3' There is no
reason to believe the two agencies cannot both carry out their duties
while avoiding inconsistency.' 32
Justice Stevens notes that while Congress did not have all
knowledge of global warming and climate change when it adopted
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, it assumed flexibility would
be necessary which is why they chose the broad language used. 133
He concludes this section of analysis by emphasizing that, because
greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's broad definition
of "air pollutant," the EPA does have the necessary statutory
authority to regulate such emissions from new motor vehicles.' 34
128. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1461.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1462; see Energy Policy Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat. 874, 42
U.S.C. § 6201(5).
131. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1462 (quoting Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
132. Id. This may be a stretch. Perhaps the rule should be that the EPA cannot
regulate in a manner which would directly conflict with the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) regulations. Hypothetically, the EPA should not be
allowed to do things like set mileage standards, a role for the DOT, but must
instead find a means of regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles in some manner which would not directly conflict with the DOT's
methods.
133. Id. As Section 202(a)(1) states:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to
time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section,
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.
Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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2. The EPA's "Even-if' Argument
In the seventh section of his opinion, Justice Stevens addresses
the EPA's argument that even if statutory authority does give the
agency the right to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles, it would be unwise to do so at this time. 135 Stevens
points out that although the statute does authorize the Administrator
to exercise "judgment," that judgment is to be exercised with respect
to an air pollutant's possible harm to health and welfare of the public,
not just a discretionary exercise of judgment for any reason. 136 The
exercise of judgment, Stevens explains, is to turn on a finding of
endangerment. 137 A finding of endangerment would require the EPA
to regulate the dangerous emissions from new motor vehicles. 38
Stevens clarifies that, under this rationale, the only way for the EPA
to avoid regulating such emission would be to find that greenhouse
gases do not contribute to climate change, or provide "some
134. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1462. In Justice Steven's opinion he clearly
views Congress' use of broad terminology to be an attempt to allow for regulatory
flexibility and provide the agency with the ability to respond to changing
circumstances that would likely arise as technology progressed over the coming
decades. This is likely a valid interpretation of Congress' choice of terminology
and would very well lead to the conclusion Stevens has come to: that greenhouse
gases were meant to be included in the definition of "air pollutant" as it became
evident through scientific advancements that such gases were becoming a threat to
the public health and welfare. Does this evaluation of Congress' intent necessarily
eliminate the possibility that Congress intended otherwise, as Scalia suggests in his
dissent? See infra section C. While Justice Stevens may be correct that broad
wording was used under Section 202(a) of the CAA to allow other, then unknown
pollutants to qualify for regulation under the statute, it may have been a stretch to
assume that such an allowance was intended to be made for greenhouse gases
specifically.
135. Id.
136. Id. As the court in Natural Resources Defense Council noted, where a
statute authorizes an agency Administrator to exercise their own discretion under
the mandates of the statute, that discretion, whether express or implied, must be
used to satisfy the statutory standard, not avoid the statutory standard. See Natural
Res. Def. Council, 824 F.2d at 1164-65. See also supra note 49 and accompanying
text (emphasizing this standard in Natural Resources Defense Council and
Massachusetts v. EPA in the final Supreme Court ruling).
137. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1462.
138. Id.
reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discretion to determine whether they do."' 3 9
Justice Stevens vehemently discredits the EPA's "laundry list" of
policy reasons given not to regulate, as having to do with whether
greenhouse gas emissions do or do not contribute to c!imate change
endangering public health and welfare) 40  In particular, the EPA
argued that regulation of greenhouse gases would conflict with the
President's goals in negotiating with foreign nations on the matter.
141
139. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1462.
140. Id. Judge Randolph, writing for the majority in D.C. Circuit Court
opinion, cited Ethyl Corp. for the proposition that policy considerations are
permissible in deciding rulemaking petitions where an assessment of risk exists.
See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58. Judge Randolph explained:
The EPA Administrator's analysis, although it did not mention
Ethyl, is entirely consistent with the case. In addition to the
scientific uncertainty about the causal effects of greenhouse gases
on the future climate of the earth, the Administrator relied upon
many "policy" considerations that, in his judgment, warranted
regulatory forbearance at this time.
Id. (quoting 68 Fed.Reg. at 52,929). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in the
present case heard by the Supreme Court, clearly ruled policy considerations were
not part of the plain language of the CAA as factors the Administrator was
permitted and required to consider in making a decision whether to permit a
rulemaking petition. Though Justice Stevens refrains from delving into the
inadequacies of reliance on Ethyl Corp. for the notion that such policy
considerations are permissible, but it would seem, on its face, that the holding in
Ethyl Corp. is in fact a valid argument to sustain policy considerations.
In Ethyl Corp. the court permitted policy considerations because the policy
considerations went to the issue of whether the statutory standard of endangerment
was met. The EPA's policy considerations in the present case, however, were not
related to a finding of endangerment. The policy considerations made by the EPA
Administrator were primarily related to effectiveness of foreign policy and
potential conflicts between the Department of Transportation and the EPA. Thus, a
clear difference exists between applying Ethyl Corp. to all situations of agency risk
assessment and allowing policy considerations to always gap-fill statutory
ambiguity as a factor in agency discretionary decisions where factors are not
explicitly provided. Merely allowing policy considerations to help agencies
determine whether statutory requirements have or have not been met before issuing
new rules and regulations seems to be the proper application of Ethyl Corp.
141. 68 Fed.Reg. at 52932. The Constitution does allocate certain matters of
foreign affairs to Congress and others to the Executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. I,
8; art. II, §§ 2-3. The courts generally agree the President plays the most prominent
role in conducting foreign relations, though this role is not without limit. See First
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Stevens points out the EPA has previously been given authority in
areas where the President also has authority yet the EPA is not
required to consult with the state department in formulating its
policies and rules.'4 2
Justice Stevens also disregards the EPA's claim that uncertainty
surrounding climate change justifies inaction by the agency. 143  If
sufficient information does not in fact exist to make an endangerment
finding, Stevens explains, the EPA must state this as its reason for
declining to engage in rulemaking. 144  In other words, the EPA
cannot just decline to regulate greenhouse gases solely because of
some uncertainty surrounding the issue because this is not in line
with the statutory context of the EPA's duties. 145
Stevens concludes by finding the EPA's decision arbitrary and
capricious because no reasons were offered as to whether greenhouse
gases contribute to climate change endangering the health and
welfare of the public. 146 Since policy concerns are not part of the
Clean Air Act's language, these are not considered valid reasons for
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972); see also
United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
142. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
143. Id. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussion of Ethyl
Corp.); see infra notes 145-46 (discussion of scientific uncertainty), infra notes
172-73 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty as a grounds for which EPA
could exercise its discretion not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
144. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
145. Id. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, makes a wholly separate argument that
seems to stand on all fours, when compared to the present argument by Justice
Stevens. Scalia notes the NRC report relied on by the EPA as evidence of
scientific ambiguity and argues the EPA, in referencing the NRC report
extensively, did explicitly state that scientific ambiguity exists. See Massachusetts,
127 S.Ct. at 1475; see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing this
argument regarding the NRC report language as specifically referencing scientific
uncertainty, but also noting that Judge Tatel, in his dissent in the D.C. Circuit
opinion, stood for the proposition that the NRC report contained adequate scientific
knowledge to determine whether endangerment exists).
146. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463. Justice Scalia takes a clearly opposite
view with regard to the validity of the EPA's reasoning, stating "The reasons the
EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly take into account
(and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to consider entering a new
field: the impact such entry would have on other Executive Branch programs and
on foreign policy." Id. at 1473 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition. 147 With these findings,
Justice Stevens reverses the Court of Appeal's judgment in favor of
the EPA and remands the case.
148
B. Chief Justice Roberts' Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts begins his dissent, joined by Justice's
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, with an admission that global warming
may be a "crisis" but emphasizes it is being handled by policymakers
in the Executive and Legislative branches. 149  He rejects the
petitioners' broad-ranging injury claim as non-justiciable based on a
narrow statute. 150 He views the issues here as ones which the
Executive branch must address, not the federal courts.' 5 ' Robert's
dissent continues on to address primarily the issue of standing, for
which this case note will give a summary but refrain from in-depth
analysis.
First, Chief Justice Roberts criticizes the majority's finding that
Massachusetts has standing because he believes the three-part
standing test as outlined in Article III of the Constitution has not been
met. Specifically, Roberts says Massachusetts and other petitioners
have failed to show particularized injury because the loss of coastal
land and other injuries resulting from global warming now and in the
future will be widespread, not particularized.' 52
Roberts then criticizes the affidavits submitted by Massachusetts
attesting to the particularized injury claimed. 153 Roberts says the
affidavits fail to establish the sort of "actual" injury the Court
147. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463. It would seem most would argue that
policy considerations should always be considered whenever any branch of the
government, or administrative agency for that matter, attempts to regulate the
actions of individuals, corporations, or other entities.
148. Id. at 1463.
149. Id. at 1463-64. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This seems to imply that no one
can ever challenge any agency action relating to global warming. The case of FEC
v. Akins, cited by the majority, yet not discussed by Chief Justice Roberts, stood for
the very proposition that concrete harm, even though it is widely spread, is enough
to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III.
153. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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described in detail because the statements were "conclusory" and
brought up other reasons, such as "land subsidence," to explain the
rising sea levels in Massachusetts and consequent loss of land.
15 4
Roberts also thinks the alleged harm was stretched over too long of a
span of time to satisfy the requirement of alleged future harm. 55 He
says the declaration that "global warming will cause sea level to rise
by 20-70 centimeters by the year 2100" is an insufficient span of time
and merely a guess at that.'56 He cites Whitmore v. Arkansas, for the
proposition that "[a] threatened injury must be certainly impending to
constitute injury in fact."'157
Chief Justice Roberts also believes the causation element of
Article III standing requirements was not met. He thinks that
petitioners failed to establish that EPA's inaction caused the alleged
injuries, since greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles are just one
small fraction of the contributing factors in causing global
warming. 5 8
As to the final element of standing, redressability, the Chief
Justice found the petitioners failed to meet this requirement as
well. 159 He explained that any fractional reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions that may result from EPA regulation of such emissions
from new motor vehicles would be completely offset by developing
nations' emissions. 160 He criticizes the majority for accepting the
petitioners argument that developing nations are more likely to
"follow suit," in a sense, if the United States began implementing
regulations on greenhouse gas emissions.' 6' He says the Court has
154. Id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Petitioners' Standing
Appendix in No. 03-1361, etc. (CADC), p. 196, 197 (Stdg. App.)).
155. Id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts explained that "In light of the
bit-part domestic new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions have played in what
petitioners' alleged injury - the loss of Massachusetts coastal land - the connection
is far to speculative. Id. at 1469. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
previously held that "a party must present facts supporting an
assertion that the actor will proceed in such a manner."
1 6 2
Chief Justice Roberts concludes his dissent by criticizing the
petitioners' motives and accusing them of using the judicial court
system as a means for carrying out its "policy debates.
'163
C. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia joins the Chief Justice's dissent in full but discusses
his dissent on the merits, leaving the standing argument out of his
opinion. 64 Scalia's first argument is that Section 202(a)(1) of the
Clean Air Act allows the EPA administrator to exercise his judgment
in deciding whether or not toregulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles. 165 He concedes that the statute "condition[s] the
exercise of EPA's authority on its formation of a 'judgment"' but
questions whether the Administrator is required to make a
"judgment" whenever a petition for rulemaking is filed. 166 Justice
Scalia claims that if Congress had intended to require such judgment
it would have chosen different wording in the statute. 167  When
Congress wants to force an agency to do something it uses terms such
as "shall.' ' 168 Scalia claims that since nowhere in the Clean Air Act
does not require the EPA to make a firm decision whenever a
rulemaking petition is filed, the EPA did not act incorrectly in failing
to explain a judgment on the issue.' 69
Justice Scalia then discredits Justice Stevens' outline of the three
ways in which the Administrator can supposedly exercise his
162. Id. at 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
165. Id. at 1471-72 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
166. Id. at 1472 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at
1462).
167. Id. at 1472 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
168. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act 29 U.S.C. § 816(b) which states "provide[d] that the Secretary of
Labor shall issue a final determination as to the misuse of CETA funds by a grant
recipient within 120 days after receiving a complaint alleging misuse").
169. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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judgment, as an invented "multiple-choice question."' 70  Scalia
argues that even if the Majority is correct and the Administrator must
have a basis for rejecting a rulemaking petition, the majority
construes this too narrowly.171 He explains that under the majority's
rationale the Administrator's judgment can be delayed "only" if he
concludes that scientific uncertainty is too profound to make an
endangerment finding, which would be too narrow an interpretation
of the statute. 172 In Scalia's view, the Administrator should be able
to avoid a rulemaking petition for other reasons besides just profound
scientific uncertainty and that such other reasons were given by the
EPA in this case.173 He then emphasizes the main points the EPA
gave for refusing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles, including that the President had laid out a
comprehensive plan and that establishing greenhouse gas emission
standards for new motor vehicles would be an inappropriate approach
to addressing climate change. 174  The EPA argued "a sensible
regulatory scheme would require that all significant sources and sinks
of [greenhouse gas] emissions be considered in deciding how best to
achieve any needed emission reductions" and that EPA regulation
could weaken the United States' efforts to persuade developing
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 175
170. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). Stevens explained the Administrator must
exercise his judgment in one of three ways:
(a) by concluding that the pollutant does cause, or contribute to,
air pollution that endangers public welfare.. .(b) by concluding
that the pollutant does not cause or contribute to, air pollution
that endangers public welfare.. .or (c) by 'provid[ing] some
reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discreation to determine whether' greenhouse gases endanger
public welfare.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1462).
171. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
172. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
173. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
174. Id. at 1472-73 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
175. Id. at 1473 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. at 52929-31).
The EPA also tried to argue that any potential benefit that would be derived from
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases would be lost to other nations which
disregarded their greenhouse gas emissions. Id. These arguments are those which
Justice Stevens refers to as the EPA's "policy" rationales. Id. at 1463.
Justice Scalia criticizes the majority for dismissing the EPA's
rationale because it was "divorced from the statutory text."' 17 6 He
agrees with the majority's reasoning, but argues instead that the
statute does not address situations in which the Administrator seeks
to defer making a judgment. Thus the statutory text according to
Scalia is silent and so it logically follows that the EPA's arguments
are not divorced from it.177 In Scalia's opinion, the EPA took into
account the typical considerations (including policy issues) an agency
would evaluate in determining whether to regulate a new area. 178 On
this point, he believes the majority imposed a limitation which lacked
any established basis. 179 Scalia concludes this section of his opinion
by pointing to the Majority's finding, that the EPA's decision did not
deserve Chevron deference, as groundless. 180 Justice Scalia proposes
that, for the reasons set forth, the agency properly declined to make a
judgment and validly denied the rulemaking petition.' 81
In the alternative, Justice Scalia explains that the same conclusion
he has come to could likewise be made based "on the Court's own
terms."' 82 He points to the majority's argument that the EPA could
have shirked its duties by making a finding of scientific uncertainty,
but only where such a finding is explicitly stated.'83 In support of the
EPA, Scalia says the agency has done exactly that in relying on the
2001 report by the National Resource Council. The report first warns
that current estimates as to future effects of global warming "should
be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments" and that
"the understanding of the relationships between weather/climate and
human health is in its infancy and therefore the health consequences
176. Id. at 1473 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at
1462). The majority's argument was that the EPA can make a judgment but that
judgment must be in relation to agency's duty to protect the health and welfare of
the people. Id.
177. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
178. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). This is precisely what many people would
argue, that an agency should consider policy issues always.
179. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
180. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
181. Id. at 1473-74 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
182. Id. at 1474 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
183. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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of climate change are poorly understood."'1 84 Besides outlining the
NRC's points in depth as to the uncertainty surrounding climate
change, Scalia "simply cannot conceive of what else the Court would
like the EPA to say." '185
In the second section of his dissent, Justice Scalia disagrees with
Justice Steven's statement that the Clean Air Act gives the EPA
authority to regulate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions because of
the broad definition of "air pollutant."'186 While he agrees that carbon
184. Id. at 1474-75 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting National Research Council,
Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, pp 1, 20). The
EPA made extensive use of the findings in the NRC's report, and included a
detailed analysis of the NRC report in its decision not to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles as requested by the petition. See 68 Fed. Reg.
52930. Judge Tatel explicitly argues in his dissent in the circuit court opinion of
this case that the NRC report provides the EPA with adequate scientific
information to determine whether global warming resulting from greenhouse gases
does endanger the public health or welfare. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 77. It
is surprising that two completely opposing sides can use the same report to support
their opinion. Where Tatel argued for the petitioners that the EPA should be
required to regulate greenhouse gases, Jusice Scalia argues the EPA should not be
held to possess such authority and that the EPA did explicitly state that insufficient
scientific authority exists; therefore, an endangerment finding cannot be made.
How can the same report containing the same information be used to support two
such opposing views? Judge Tatel viewed the NRC report as providing enough
information to make the so-called "endangerment finding," while the majority in
the Supreme Court opinion argued simply that the EPA had failed altogether to
make a decision as to endangerment and failed to explicitly establish that there was
sufficient uncertainty to do so, and Scalia argues the language in the NRC report
does just that - provides sufficient information to establish that scientific
uncertainty exists. The use of the NRC report by the EPA was to establish not the
scientific understanding of global warming but to established the very opposite:
uncertainty. While Tatel's dissent is arguably the closest the circuit court got to
what eventually became the Supreme Court majority's opinion on the case, the
majority was obviously not satisfied with the EPA's use of the report to express
scientific uncertainty as Justice Scalia suggests.
185. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1475 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
186. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting § 202(a)(1)). In a related footnote to
this portion of Scalia's opinion, he points to the majority's conclusion that "air
pollution" includes "all airborne compounds of whatever stripe." Id. at 1476 n.2
(quoting id. at 1460). From this Scalia reasons the majority's supposedly
overbroad interpretation would include "everything airborne, from Frisbees to
flatulence, qualifies as an 'air pollutant'." Id. at 1476. Apparently, subsequent
research confirmed this is the first time the term "flatulence" has made it into a
U.S. Supreme Court opinion. Timothy J. Dowling & Jennifer Bradley, Global
dioxide is clearly included in the definition of "air pollutant," Scalia
argues the point that, under section 302(g) of the Clean Air Act, the
definition of "air pollutant" contains two parts, under one of which
greenhouse gases do not qualify.1 87 As Scalia views the situation, an
"air pollutant" must not only be "physical, chemical,...substance[s]
or matter which [are] emitted into or otherwise ente[r] the ambient
air" under the second half of the definition, but also an "an air
pollution agent or combination of such agents" under the first half.88
He emphasizes petitioners' argument that the use of the word
"including" joining the first phrase to the second means that anything
following the word "must necessarily be a subset of whatever
precedes it."189 By citing the petitioners' example, Scalia illustrates
that the portion of the definition preceding the word "including" acts
to limit the second half of the definition.1 90 Thus, an air pollutant can
be "any physical, chemical,...substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air," but it must also be an "air
pollution agent or combination of such agents."'' 9'
The question then becomes: are greenhouse gases agents of air
pollution? In furthering his argument for the application of Chevron
deference to the EPA's decision, Justice Scalia points out that the
term "air pollution" is not defined by the Clean Air Act, thus the EPA
Warming in the Supreme Court: What Does Massachusetts v. EPA Mean ForYyou
(and Planet Earth)?, 59.8 ENVTL. LAW 3, 5 (August 2007).
187. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1475 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting §
7602(g)).
188. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)). Section 302(g)
of the Clean Air Act, defining "air pollutant" reads in full:
The term "air pollutant" means any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear
material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term
includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to
the extent the Administrator has identified such precursor or
precursors for the particular purpose for which the term "air
pollutant" is used.
Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
189. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1475 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting §
7602(g)).
190. Id. at 1476 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
191. Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
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interpreted the ambiguous term. 192 Scalia explains that because the
petition for rulemaking called for regulation in order to "reduce the
risk of global climate change," the EPA had to determine whether the
greenhouse gases responsible for global climate change are in fact
"air pollution." 193 He defers to the EPA's argument on this point,
that the problems associated with greenhouse gases are atmospheric,
in the upper atmosphere, not the ground level, or near surface,
pollution traditionally termed "air pollution."'194 Scalia then proceeds
to then define both "air" and "pollute" to further establish his support
of the EPA's theory that the term "air pollution" under the Clean Air
Act includes only those substances polluting the air near ground
level.1 95
192. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Since Chevron
deference is shown when the agency interprets an ambiguous term, as previously
established, it follows from Scalia's argument, that Chevron deference should be
applied in the present case. Under this rationale, Justice Scalia must prove the EPA
interpreted the term in a manner that is a "permissible construction of the statute."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
193. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting 68 Fed.
Reg. at 52,925).
194. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,926-27. In fact, Scalia is under the impression the
"upper reaches of the atmosphere" is not "air" in the traditional sense.
Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
195. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J. dissenting). To define "air"
and "pollute," Justice Scalia turns to a 1949 version of Webster's Dictionary.
According to Webster's, "pollute" means "[t]o make or render impure or unclean."
The first three definitions of "air" are: 1) "[t]he invisible, odorless, and tasteless
mixture of gases which surrounds the earth"; 2) "[t]he body of the earth's
atmosphere; esp. the part of it near the earth, as distinguished from the upper
rarefied part'; 3) "[a] portion of air or of the air considered with respect to physical
characteristics or as affecting the senses." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1910 (2d ed. 1949). Thus, Scalia concludes that since greenhouse
gases are affecting the upper atmosphere, as opposed to the near earth atmosphere,
such gases are not included in the definition of "air" as used by the Clean Air Act
so the EPA is not required to regulate them.
Critics of Scalia's dissent wrote that the word "air," as currently understood
(not as defined by a decades-old dictionary), is not simply limited to the ground-
level portions of the atmosphere. Dowling, 59.8 ENVTL. LAW at 5. The critics
reference the lengthy subchapter of the Clean Air Act "designed to preserve the
stratospheric ozone layer from pollutants that degrade the protective shield." Id.
Most notably, greenhouse gases do not just collect and exist in the upper
atmosphere, but collect at equal concentrations throughout the atmosphere from
upper to lower. Id. Thus, even if Scalia's argument that "air pollution" refers to
In his concluding paragraphs, Justice Scalia chastises the Court
for failing to explain why "air pollution" should encompass global
climate change, apparently viewing the dictionary definitions of the
two words to be evidence of the intent of the drafters of the Clean Air
Act. 196 He seems appalled that Justice Stevens determined Chevron
deference was not applicable after failing to clarify this important
point. 197 Scalia views this case as "straightforward administrative-
law" regardless of the importance of action in the face of global
warming.' 98 He emphasizes, in his closing line, the importance of
upholding "the reasoned judgment of [a] responsible agency."' 99
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Legal Impact
While Massachusetts v. EPA answered a number of important
questions, including issues of standing and interpretation of the Clean
Air Act, one of the most important for future litigation was the
Court's criticism of the agency's decision making process. In
holding that the EPA could not rely on any other factors besides
public health and welfare in determining whether to deny the
rulemaking petition, the court laid down strict guidelines for future
agencies.2"' It is now clear that agencies are not, in fact, able to take
ground-level air pollution, this would still include a relevant portion of greenhouse
gases.
With regard to Scalia's dismissal of the term "pollutant" as not including harm
to the upper atmosphere and ozone layer, critics quickly point out that Section 103
of the Clean Air Act expressly refers to carbon dioxide as an "air pollutant." Id.
Further, The Clean Air Act requires regulation of pollutants which lead not to
impurities in the air but to acid rain which affects the lakes, thus the EPA is not
restricted to regulating only those pollutants that affect the breathable air. Further,
the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to regulate vehicular pollutant that "endanger
public health and welfare," and "welfare" is defined as including effects on both
weather and climate. Id. (quoting Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521); see
supra note 23 and accompanying text (citing the language within the Clean Air Act
defining "welfare").
196. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
197. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
198. Id. at 1477-78 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
199. Id. at 1478 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
200. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
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into account policy concerns or international issues in making
decisions whether or not to carry out their duties unless the statute
granting them such authority explicitly provides for such
considerations or such considerations are used to make the finding
required by statute. Agencies are to look to their authorizing statutes,
and only these statutes, in making regulatory decisions when called
upon by a rulemaking petition. This severely limits agencies and
may prevent agencies from considering the broader impact of their
decisions for lack of ability to review policy considerations.
With regard to administrative agency discretion and authority, it
could be argued that this case strips agencies of some level of
decision making power and vests it back in Congress. This case
clearly places strict emphasis on Congress' terminology in statutes
granting authority or otherwise instructing agencies to act. The
agency's power or authority to deny a rulemaking petition no longer
rests solely on the agency administrator's interpretation of the issue
at hand, but now must fall within the guidelines and parameters of
the language in the authorizing statute. A decision based on anything
else would be considered, as a result of Massachusetts v. EPA, to be
arbitrary and capricious. Thus, an agency administrator is bound to
regulate unless it can be determined otherwise under only the
terminology of the authorizing statute.
The Court held that not only are agency decisions to decline
rulemaking judicially reviewable but they are subject to review under
the arbitrary and capricious standard.2 ' While this standard is
generally one which gives a great deal of deference to the agency, the
manner in which it was applied here led to the agency being held to a
higher standard. The EPA's discretionary decision was criticized as
not conforming to the strict wording of the Clean Air Act. Where an
agency decision would historically been given a great deal of
lenience in favor of restraining judicial control of agency decisions,
the standard seems to have been applied here using a much stricter
interpretation.
Two programs for setting greenhouse gas emissions standards are
sure to be affected by the Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v.
EPA. The New Source Performance Standards program administered
by the EPA, and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program,
201. Id. at 1459.
administered by the states subject to EPA supervision, both apply to
new and modified sources and require such sources to install
advanced pollution-control technology. 20 2 If the EPA does in fact
makes an endangerment finding, regulations would be triggered
under both programs. Prior to litigation of Massachusetts v. EPA,
environmental interest groups had sought EPA greenhouse gas
regulation under the New Source Performance Standards program,
and were denied their rulemaking petition by the EPA.a°3 The appeal
of this denial was stayed due to the case of Massachusetts v. EPA,
which will now likely be renewed in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in this case. 0 4
Importantly, The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA, will affect a number of cases currently filed, seeking to hold
various industries responsible for regulating their greenhouse gas
emissions. 215 Since the Court has ruled the EPA does have authority
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, "a
serious question arises as to whether federal common law nuisance
claims based on [greenhouse gas] emissions are not preempted.' 20 6
Also, in a number of cases energy and chemical companies were sued
under state and federal common law theories in federal court in
Mississippi for their greenhouse gas emissions alleged contribution to
the intensity of Hurricane Katrina. a0 1 With the Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, questions will arise in these cases as to the
application of Mississippi common law to out-of-state greenhouse
gas emissions.
The Court's denial of the EPA's foreign policy argument will
likely have a significant effect on certain pending cases. In Central
202. Peter S. Glaser & Douglas A. Henderson, Massachusetts v. EPA Global
Warming Decision: What Does It Mean?, 22.2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 48, 49
(Fall 2007). This advanced pollution-control technology is referred to as Best
Demonstrated Technology and Best Available Control Technology under the two
separate programs. Both are determined by considering the feasibility of possibly
technology which does not have to be commercially common in the industry but
does have to be practical and available. Id.
203. Id. at 49-50.
204. Id. at 50.
205. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
206. Glasser, 22.2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T at 50.
207. Id.
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Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, automobile manufacturers
argued against implementation of California law limiting greenhouse
gas emissions from automobiles registered in the state. 208 Notably,
the auto manufacturers argued state regulation of this sort is
preempted because it conflicts with federal foreign policy as well as
the Clean Air Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.2 °9
The EPA refused to grant a preemption waiver under Section 209 of
the Clean Air Act, at which point Judge Ishii disregarded the claim
that the CAA acts to preempt state law on the matter.210 The case
was placed on hold pending the outcome of Massachusetts v. EPA.
Since the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA indicated clearly that the
EPA is not to make foreign policy considerations in determining
whether it should regulate greenhouse gas emissions itself, it is likely
the court will find in Witherspoon that the same analysis should
apply and foreign relations considerations should not be accounted
for in reviewing California's regulations.
Clearly, the Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA was viewed
as a strong "win" for environmentalists. The Clean Air Act, on the
other hand, benefited in a less obvious way. The Act has now been
clearly cited by the Supreme Court as the standard upon which the
EPA should base its decision-making.
B. Broad Impact
The societal impact of the Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA
is currently in debate. The decision leaves little to work with in
determining future regulation of harmful substances not within the
natural or ordinary definitions of existing statutes since the decision
merely remands the case for reconsideration by the EPA. Certainly,
the ruling that greenhouse gases are "air pollutants" under Section
202 of the Clean Air Act will lead to regulation of such gases from
motor vehicles which will begin to reduce global warming and,
hopefully, slow climate change. Although the decision does
theoretically leave the option open to the EPA to decline to regulate
greenhouse gases if the EPA finds that such pollutants do not meet
208. See Cent. Valley Chrysler Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160
(E.D. Ca. 2006).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1173-75.
the endangerment finding required, it is unlikely that such a decision
would be made by the EPA, given current public policy and
movements against global warming.
Perhaps the Court's ruling will encourage Congress to take a
more aggressive role in implementing laws to limit greenhouse gas
emissions and other causes of global warming. One commentator
expressed the notion that while Massachusetts v. EPA may "set the
direction in the near term, in the end it will remain up to Congress to
decide the nature, scope, and timing of a [greenhouse gas] regulatory
program."2 1'
While the decision is still the EPA's so long as they abide by the
direction of the court, it is almost certain the EPA will grant the
rulemaking petition since the Court has left the agency virtually no
choice in the matter.212 However, the EPA is free to choose how and
to what extreme they wish to implement greenhouse gas emission
standards so long as such regulations are within their statutory
authority. This uncertainty as to how the EPA will ultimately choose
to carry out this regulatory scheme has already led the automotive
industry to increase fuel efficiencies out of fear of future stringent
EPA regulations.213 Though the impact of the decision ultimately
rests within the EPA's authority under Title II of the Clean Air Act in
regulation of motor vehicles, the way the court has pronounced its
ruling leaves the same conclusions to be made as to the EPA's
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the much
broader Title I of the Act.214 Thus, this fear of future EPA regulation
211. Glaser, supra note 202 at 49.
212 . It would be exceedingly difficult for the EPA to find that greenhouse gas
emissions are not dangerous to the public health or welfare after the Court went to
great lengths to explain the harmful effects greenhouse gases are having on the
environment, and therefore the public health and welfare.
213. This is evident in the increasing number of advertising campaigns by
vehicle manufacturers touting the greater fuel economy of their vehicles. However,
some may argue this was spurred by consumer desire to counter the skyrocketing
prices at the fuel pump, not automobile manufactures' fear of impending EPA
greenhouse gas emission standards.
214. While the original petition to the EPA sought only regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor-vehicles under Title II of the Clean Air
Act, the Court's ruling only applies to that Title. Under Title I, however, stationary
and area sources are regulated by much the same wording as Title II. However, the
EPA would not be required under this Court's ruling to apply the same standards to
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may similarly be spurring other industries to begin research and
implementation of new technologies which will reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions as well.
Arguably, vesting the EPA with the authority to regulate carbon
dioxide could mean much more than just tighter emissions standards
for automobiles because of the broad terminology of Title I and the
court's manner of ruling in this case. In an earlier 1994 case against
the EPA brought by the American Lung Association, the court ruled
the EPA was obligated to review existing air quality standards for
particulate matter and would be required to consider a new
standard.215 The EPA obligingly proposed to tighten air quality
standards for ozone and particulate matter. The proposed rules, the
largest, costliest, and most controversial in EPA history, were
promulgated in November 1996.216 The subsequent Congress was
unable to reverse the rule and they were only later invalidated by a
federal court. Critics voice a very real concern that similar broad
reaching regulations will be proposed by the EPA now that it has
been granted authority to wrestle with carbon dioxide emissions as a
result of Massachusetts v. EPA.217
While most environmentalists view the Court's ruling in
Massachusetts v. EPA as a victory, businesses are already concocting
methods for avoiding lost profits and spreading the costs of any new
regulation schemes amongst themselves. As one strategic law firm
wrote in a memo preparing its corporate clients for likely EPA
emissions regulations, "[i]f a business changes its operations to
reduce its impact on the climate, it can often sell the 'credit' for those
changes to another business that is not so climate neutral." '218 This
stationary and area sources. It necessarily follows that, because the EPA has
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under Title II, it also has authority to
regulate the same under Title I.
215. See Am. Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994).
216. Jonathan H. Adler, Regulating Greenhouse Gases: Will EPA Take a
Dive, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Jan. 13, 2000,
http://www.cei.org/gencon/004,01707.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (analyzing
the potential issues presented by the appeal of the rulemaking petition denial if the
EPA were to be ordered to regulate greenhouse gas emissions)
217. Id.
218. David G. Mandelbaum, Environmental and Energy and Project Finance
Memo: What's All This About Climate Change Means For Domestic Businesses
Spin 208Msahstsv P
theory could essentially lead to an evening out of emissions rather
than a reduction of emissions overall.
Some are even concerned that regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles will result in smaller, lighter cars
which are, arguably, less safe than those already on the road. Along
this line of reasoning, arguments are being made that dramatic
increases in the federal fuel economy standards would increase the




While the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
does not directly issue regulation of greenhouse gas emissions nor
does it expressly order the EPA to do so, it is clear that the Supreme
Court intends this to be the case. At the agency level, the Supreme
Court's decision strips administrative agencies of the right to make
policy and international considerations in its discretionary decisions.
The language of authorizing statutes is strictly upheld by the Court as
the agency's sole means for determining the parameters within which
it can exercise its discretion. A review of an agency decision for
arbitrary and capricious conduct now entails a stricter scrutiny of the
agency's method for decision making and analysis of the factors used
when the decision involves a denial of a petition for rulemaking. In
this way, the Court set a precedent that there is a distinct difference in
review of an agency's refusal to enforce a rule or regulation and an
agency's refusal to initiate rulemaking. This is likely due to the fact
that a refusal to enact rules may directly conflict with duties and
responsibilities Congress has expressly directed the agency to carry
Right Now, Ballard, Spahr, Anders & Ingersoll, LLP (April 24, 2007) available at
http://www.ballardspahr.com/files/tbl_sl 1Newsletters/PDFFile 142/937/
04-24-07EnvironmentalEnergyAlert.pdf
219. Jonathan H. Adler, The Coming Greenhouse Power Grab, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1999 (discussing the potential impact of the case just after the petition for
rulemaking was filed with EPA for regulation of greenhouse gases). This is an
interesting twist on the issue as most scholars and analysts are concerned with the
legal impact of the case or business impact as a result of increasingly strict
emission standards. It is also notable that before petitioners even reached the D.C.
Circuit court with their appeal, journalists were already in a frenzy of concern over
what could potentially happen if the EPA were to regulate vehicle emissions.
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out, whereas enforcement of a rule involves an agency's
interpretation of their own regulation as well as the conduct of the
violating party, a more technical analysis.
The Supreme Court made expressly clear that a denial of a
petition for rulemaking by an agency in its discretionary capacity
must strictly adhere to the statutory language governing its authority.
Where an agency administrator may, in his discretion, refuse to
regulate a matter, such refusal must fall clearly within the confines of
the statute. As the Court found in the instant case, the EPA
Administrator was permitted, in his discretion, to refuse to regulate
under the Clean Air Act only if the Administrator found that he was
being asked to regulate that which would not "endanger" the public
health or welfare, and any uncertainty as to this finding need be
explicitly conveyed in the refusal to promulgate rules.
Congress has made clear through the Clean Air Act that the EPA
is charged with the duty of regulating pollution that may endanger
the health or welfare of the public. The Court in this case has ruled
that "air pollution," as it is used in the Clean Air Act, includes
greenhouse gas emissions which, as proved by respected scientists
through detailed reports, are causing global warming and climate
change. Thus, barring an explicit finding by the EPA that climate
change does not pose potential harm to the health or welfare of the
public, the EPA must regulate such emissions from new motor-
vehicles, as addressed by petitioners in their request for rulemaking
under Title II of the Clean Air Act.
Though the ramifications of the Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts v. EPA are not yet known, many are speculating about
what the future may hold as a result of the case. Primarily, the effect
the holding will likely have on auto-makers is at the forefront of the
debate and may include tighter fuel efficiency standards perhaps
resulting is smaller, less safe vehicles. Other industries are
concerned, given the similarity between the Title I and Title II
language of the Clean Air Act and that the EPA could clearly
regulate under Title II, similar regulation may begin as to stationary
sources under Title I. Businesses are frantically searching for ideas to
assist them in spreading what could be a very large regulatory cost
among other industry members.
